Since there is no Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction or Extra-Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of this court to-day, part IX and Order XLIX of the Code are practically useless. It should further be remembered that the juris- diction exercised by this court under the Admiralty Act, Court the Companies Act and other statutory pro- visions are neither Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction nor Extra-ordinary civil Jurisdiction of this court rather they are Special Statutory Jurisdiction of this Court and the actions initiated under those laws are governed by the respective statutes and the rules framed thereunder. We have already seen that the jurisdiction exercised by this court as Admiralty Court emanates from the statute and the procedure is governed by the Rules framed thereunder. Thus Rule 35 of the Admiralty Rule will prevail over the provisions of the Code. Besides, the provisions of Part IX and Order XLIX of the Code have no manner of application to the instant cases, as the Admiralty Jurisdiction is completely different from both Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the erstwhile High Court. In Rule 3 of the Admiralty Rules it has been provided that a suit shall be instituted by a plaint drawn up, subscribed and verified according to the provisions of the Code and excepting as provided in Rule 3, there is nothing in the Rules which made the Code applicable for any other purpose in a proceeding in suit brought before the Admiralty Court. Provision of Rule 51 is very clear and it can not be construed to say that it makes the Code applicable to Admiralty Suit. Thus I do not find any force or substance in this argument.

Ref: 10 M.L.R(HC)(2005) -212
 

A company in voluntary liquidation owed £501 in respect of purchase tax. An offer of 17s. 6d. in the & was made by a nominee of the directors to all the trade creditors and the Commissioners of Customs and Excise. The latter refused this offer, and proceeded to levy distress for the amount owing in respect of purchase tax. The liquidators applied to the court for an order staying the distress:-
HELD: there were no special circumstances which would justify the court in allowing the distress to proceed, it being admitted that the purchase tax was not an assessed tax to which preference was given by the Companies Act, 1929, s. 264.
EDITORIAL NOTE. In the case of a compulsory winding up, the Companies Act, 1929, s. 174 now makes it impossible for a creditor to levy a distress or execution on the goods of the company. The position is that the goods of the company are theoretically in the custody of an officer of the court and no interference with his custody and possession can be allowed. A voluntary winding up, on the other hand, is purely a domestic affair of the company and there is no theoretical reason why a creditor to whom the remedy of distress or execution is available should not exercise that remedy. There is, however, a practical reason why these remedies should be at least controlled by the court, for the purpose of the winding up, whether compulsory or voluntary, is the equitable distribution of the assets of the company among the creditors. When a distress is levied against the goods of a company in voluntary liquidation, the liquidator can always apply to the court to stay the distress, and he is entitled to an order unless the creditor can show that there are special circumstances justifying his proceeding with the distress. It should be noted that it was agreed that the purchase tax was not an assessed tax within the Companies Act, 1929, s. 264, and thus a preferential debt. 

Ref: 3 All ENG L.R (1941) -471