Arbitration Cases
2025-10-07
It can at best be said that the cause of action under sub-section (2) of section 8 would not arise until the expiry of 15 clear days from the date of service of the notice, because an agreement between the parties on the question of the appointment of a new arbitrator on any day within the said period will take away the jurisdiction of the Court to intervene. An application filed before the expiry of the said period may thus be regarded as premature in that particular circumstance, and the application may be dismissed, if it is taken up for hearing before the expiry of the said period. If however, the party served with the notice, does not communicate his concurrence within the said period on the question of the selection of an arbitrator, the application which was previously filed would be deemed to be perfectly in order after the expiry of the said period. The acquisition of jurisdiction by the Court is dependent upon the failure of the parties to reach an agreement within the specified time, and not on the application which may be filed to invoke the said jurisdiction, as that is obviously a matter of procedure.
Ref: 28 D.L.R(AD) (1976)- 22
2025-10-03
Under sub-section (1), in any of the three contingencies as stated in clauses (a) (b) and (c) any party may propose the appointment of an arbitrator or umpire, as the case may be, and serve a notice upon the other party or arbitrator, as the case may be, to concur in such appointment. The jurisdiction of the Court to make an appointment under sub-section (2) arises only when the parties have failed to come to an agreement in this regard. Time of clear 15 days is allowed under sub-section (2) to the parties concerned to come to an agreement in regard to the appointment of a new arbitrator or an umpire. Failure of the parties to reach an agreement in this matter appears to be the foundation of the Court's power of appointment and such a failure to come to an agreement may be inferred, if one party lets the other party know his choice of a new arbitrator or umpire by serving a notice upon him and the other party does not communicate his concurrence within 15 days of the said notice.
Ref: 28 D.L.R(AD) (1976)- 22
2025-10-03
Under sub-section (1), in any of the three contingencies as stated in clauses (a) (b) and (c) any party may propose the appointment of an arbitrator or umpire, as the case may be, and serve a notice upon the other party or arbitrator, as the case may be, to concur in such appointment. The jurisdiction of the Court to make an appointment under sub-section (2) arises only when the parties have failed to come to an agreement in this regard. Time of clear 15 days is allowed under sub-section (2) to the parties concerned to come to an agreement in regard to the appointment of a new arbitrator or an umpire. Failure of the parties to reach an agreement in this matter appears to be the foundation of the Court's power of appointment and such a failure to come to an agreement may be inferred, if one party lets the other party know his choice of a new arbitrator or umpire by serving a notice upon him and the other party does not communicate his concurrence within 15 days of the said notice.
Ref: 28 D.L.R(AD) (1976)- 22
2025-09-30
All those laws which had some international Implication in the sense that they involved some international agreement, commitment, obligation or relationship made, undertaken or created by the Government of India or Government of Pakistan which functioned as the administrative authorities in the past in the territories now Bangladesh, cannot be deemed to be the agreement, commitment, obligation or relationship made, undertaken or created by the new State of Bangladesh, unless specifically accepted by it.
Ref: 27 D.L.R (1975)- 585
2025-09-17
The basic concept which underlies the Proclamation of Independence is that a new State has been founded in the midst of a war with the State of Pakistan. This Proclamation as well as the Laws Continuance Enforcement Order were made at a time when the war was being waged. By the Enforcement Order, the continuance of all the laws which were in force in the territory, now Bangladesh, was enforced only subject to the Proclamation, with the result that those laws which were not in derogation of the sovereign status of the new international personality, were continue inforce.
Ref: 27 D.L.R (1975)- 584
2025-09-15
Bangladesh has not obviously succeeded to any international agreement, commitment, obligation or relationship which the State of Pakistan might have made, undertaken or created, with reference to some other State, or States, and such an agreement, commitment obligation or relationship could not be foisted upon this new State unless the same was specifically accepted by it in exercise of its independent will as a sovereign State.
Ref: 27 D.L.R (1975)- 584
2025-09-14
The proclamation of Independence which provided legal sanction for the emergence of the State of Bangladesh as a new international personality become effective from the 26th March, 1971. The laws which were in force in Bangladesh on the 25th March, 1971 were those which were made by the State of Pakistan and those amongst these laws were continued in force, which did not militate against, but were consistent with the international personality of the State of Bangladesh as a new member of the family of nations. Some of the Pakistani laws might have reflected or been based on, some international agreement or commitment made or obligation undertaken or any special relationship, either of amity or of enmity, created by the State of Pakistan. People's Republic of Bangladesh, which has been established, by waging a war against Pakistan, as an expression of the sovereign will of the people of Bangladesh, he came a new member of the comity of nations in its own right.
Ref: 27 D.L.R (1975)- 584
2025-09-06
It will appear from a perusal of the Laws Continuance Enforcement Order, 1971 that by it the laws which were in force in Bangladesh on the 25th March, 1971 have been continued in force subject to one very important qualification, namely, that such laws must be consistent with the Proclamation of Independence and shall undergo such consequential changes as may be necessary on account of the certain of the governing Independent State of Bangladesh formed by the will of the people of Bangladesh.
Ref: 27 D.L.R (1975)- 584
2025-09-03
The emergence of a new international personality in the shape of the Sovereign State of Bangladesh took place on the 26th March, 1971 In accordance with the declaration of independence made by Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on the said day at Dacca, and confirmed by the Proclamation of Independence issued by the People's Representatives from Mujibnagar on the 10th of April, 1971. The new State having been born in the midst of a bloody and atrocious war imposed by Pakistan upon the people of Bangladesh, and the newly constituted State being in immediate need of the laws which be required for running an orderly government In the territories over which they established their control, all those laws which were in force iu Bangladesh on the 25th of March, 1971, but consistent with the sovereign status of the newly born state were continued in force by virtue of a very brief but significant enciment which was called Laws Continuance Enforcement Order, issued from Mujibnagar, on the same day as the Proclamation of Independence.
Ref: 27 D.L.R (1975)- 584
2025-09-02
Having regard to the International State practice and the generally accepted view of inter-national law as to state succession, Bangladesh cannot be deemed, in ordinary course, to have acceded to the international commitments or obligations made or undertaken by Pakistan or any other state, which was exercising control in the territories, now Bangladesh without its express consent. The founding fathers of the first constitutional document therefore, by making the continuance of the Pakistan laws in force in Bangladesh subject to the Proclamation of Independence and also such consequential changes as may be necessary as a result of the creation of the new State of Bangladesh, made it clear that only those laws which were consistent with the sovereign and independent status of Bangladesh as an International person would continue.
Ref: 27 D.L.R (1975)-583
2025-09-01
Later on, the 1st defendant filed the charter-party agreement together with an application praying for stay of the suit under section 34 of the Arbitration Act pending a reference to arbitration. The 2nd defendant filed a separate petition praying that pending the decision on the first defendant's petition under section 34 further proceedings in the suit against it be stayed on the ground that he was a mere agent of the 1st defendant.
Ref: 26 D.L.R (SC)(1974)- 8
2025-08-28
The suit against the two defendants (one being a foreign shipping company and the other being its local agent) was for recovery of damages for loss sustained by the plaintiff". Both the defendants appeared and applied for adjournment of the suit to enable them to file the charier party agreement between both the parties in terms of which the dispute was to be referred to arbitration and also to pray for stay of the suit under section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
Ref: 26 D.L.R (SC)(1974)- 8
2025-08-26
If one arbitrator makes an award beyond time, the delay may be condoned at any time by the Court in a proper case, for section 28 of the Act gives power to the Court to extend time even after the award had been made and as such it cannot be said that the arbitrator's award given beyond time becomes unsustainable on the ground that the arbitrator had ceased to have jurisdiction. The award given beyond time is voidable but the opposite parties did not make any attempt to have the award set aside on the ground of its heaving been made beyond time.
Ref: 25 D.L.R (1973)- 287
2025-08-25
A partnership dispute was referred to arbitration consisting of 8 arbitrators of whom 7 arbitrators entered into the reference on that very day and they appointed one of them as the Chairman of the arbitration council. The arbitrators could not finalist the award within the stipulated time and filed an application for extension of time for completion of the award 9 which is nearing completion. The trial court refused the prayer for extension on the ground that the arbitrators by appointing a Chairman of the arbitration council did not in fact appoint a legal and proper unpireas required under section 8 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and, therefore, they committed an illegality which could not be rectified by them at that stage.
Held: Appointment of a Chairman of the arbitration council is of course different from appointing an umpire of the arbitration council but non-appointment of an umpire within the stipulated time as required under section 8 of the Arbitration Act, does not ipso facto vitiate an arbitration proceeding. In the present case as the award is almost complete, the reason of delay should not stand in the way of the parties in obtaining the award.
Ref: 23 D.L.R (1971)- 104
2025-08-24
Arbitrator appointed by the Chief Engineer as per terms of the arbitration agreement refused to act as an arbitrator. Thereafter, a party to the arbitration agreement served notice to the other party to concur with his appointment of a new arbitrator but before expiry of the notice period (15 days) as allowed by section 8(2) of the Arbitration Act, filed an application in court for appointment of an arbitrator and the court appointed an arbitrator. It was contended on behalf of the other party that the appointment was illegal because the application in this case was filed before expiry of the notice period.
Held: The prohibition in appointing an arbitrator before the expiry of the notice period is on the court but not on filing the application. Filing an application in court for appointment of an arbitrator before expiry of the notice period is at the most, an irregularity which does not vitiate the proceeding itself.
Ref: 22 D.L.R(SC)(1970)- 702
2025-08-16
The arbitrators gave an award on 19-8-57 in favour of the respondent for Rs. 30,000/-. The award was filed in court by the Registrar for making it the rule of the Court. The appellant contended that the award was in nullity as it had been made beyond four months from the date on which the arbitrators had entered on the reference (1. e. the day on which the notice was issued to the appellant by the Registrar). It was further urged that if the notice issued by the Registrar was not to be treated as entering on the reference by the arbitrators, the award was vitiated as no notice was issued by the arbitrators to the appellant. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the arbitrators entered on the reference on 3-4-57 the date on which the Registrar issued notice to the appellant to deposit cost and to file his statement. The award having been made on 19-8-57 it was beyond four months as provided in Clause 3 of the First Schedule to the Arbitration Act.
Ref: 21 D.L.R(SC)(1969)- 405
2025-08-13
The appellant failed to take delivery and the respondent thereupon, in accordance with the arbitration clause in the contract between them, filed a claim, with the Dacca-Narayanganj Chamber of Commerce, which represented the short-fall between the contract price and the market price. In accordance with the Chamber's Rules the Registrar of the Tribunal of Arbitration issued notice on the appellant on 3-4-57 directing him to pay Rs. 450/-as costs and also to file his statement. Thereafter on 21-5-57 the Registrar in accordance with the Rules appointed arbitrators to deal with the respondent's claim.
Ref: 21 D.L.R(SC)(1969)- 405
2025-08-11
In the present case reference to the arbitrator was made on 21-6-66. On 22-6-66 a letter was received by arbitrator sent by one of the parties to the dispute asking the arbitrator to enter on the reference and take all needful steps to complete the award without delay. The letter further informed the arbitrator that on his failure to enter on the reference within two weeks from the date of receipt of the letter the party shall take necessary step to enforce his right. Up to 18-10-66, that is, four days prior to completion of four months from the date of receipt of the letter the arbitrator having failed to enter on the reference, the present suit was instituted by the plaintiff under section 11 of the Arbitration Act for his removal.
Ref: 21 D.L.R(1969)- 793
2025-08-10
Suits against 2 foreign companies were brought in a local court Impleading the foreign companies as well as their local agent representing the companies. The local agent took steps in the shape of asking adjournments to put in W. S. and also service of summons on one of the defendant company-Defendant companies (hereafter in-dependently sought stay of proceeding under section 34 of the Arbitration Act on the ground that the dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement between the par-ties-Prayer disallowed as the defendant companies through their agent had taken steps in the suits conferring thereby jurisdiction on the court for adjudication of the dispute; the other two grounds for disallowing the prayer being that the grant of the prayer may lead to conflict of decisions if the suit is stayed against the defendant-companies, but allowed to proceed against their local agent and further the involvement of heavy cost on the part of the plain-tiff to conduct the arbitration proceedings in a foreign land. The general principle is that the act of the agent in the ordinary course of his business binds the principal-But the case will be otherwise if the right of one defendant is quite independent and separate from that of the other.
Ref: 20 D.L.R(SC)(1968)- 225
2025-08-09
By reading the provisions of section 41 of the Arbitration Act in the provisions of section 107(2) of the Civil Procedure Code it becomes apparent that the powers conferred by section 28 on the original Court for exclusion of time are exercisable by the court of appeal. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to all appeals under the Arbitration Act. One of the provisions is that the appellate court shall exercise the same power as is conferred on the original court. The words in section 107(2) of the O. P. Code are: "by this Code", but by virtue of section 41 of the Arbitration Act they must be assimilated to powers conferred by the Arbitration Act on an original court.
Ref: 20 D.L.R(SC)(1968)- 22
2025-08-07
When the proceedings were being conducted by the Arbitrators Dacca-Narayanganj Chamber of Commerce and Industry who are named in the Arbitration Clause a resolution was passed by the same Dacca-Narayanganj Chamber of Commerce and Industries on 11.8.59 in which following resolution was adopted: "Resolved that the name and style of this Chamber shall hence-forth be Narayanganj Chamber of Commerce & Industry.
Ref: 20 D.L.R (1968)- 1111
2025-08-05
When the plaintiffs abandoned their intention to have arbitration without the intervention of Court and subsequently sought arbitration with the intervention of Court by making an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act arbitration can no more be deemed to have commenced on 14.3.54 on which date the plaintiffs required the defendants to appoint their arbitrator. Hence, the application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act having been made after the expiry of the period of three years from the date of cancellation of the contract, the plaintiffs' claim thereunder was bar-red by limitation.
Ref: 20 D.L.R (1968)-728
2025-08-03
When the defendants, inspire of the plaintiffs' notice, dated 14.3.54 did not appoint their arbitrator, the plaintiffs ought to have appointed their own arbitrator as the sole arbitrator under section 9 of the Act. But the plaintiffs neglected to appoint a sole arbitrator, and after of the expiry of the normal period of limitation (1.e. after the period of 3 years was over) made an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act on 25. 9. 54, seeking arbitration this time with the intervention of Court. Thus, arbitration, without the intervention of Court originally initiated by the plaintiffs was not pursued by them and the same became abortive for their own laches by lapse of time.
Ref: 20 D.L.R (1968)- 728
2025-08-02
Arbitration proceeding thereupon commenced and two arbitrators were appointed to settle the dispute but they having disagreed, an umpire was appointed who disallowed all claims of the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation. The plain meaning of sub-section (3) of section 37 is that for the purposes of section 37 and of the Limitation Act, an arbitration shall be deemed to be commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement gives to the other party a notice to appoint an arbitrator named in the agreement. (In the present case such a notice was served, as stated above on 14-3-54.
Ref: 20 D.L.R (1968)- 728
2025-07-31
The plaintiff sent a notice on 14-3-54 to the defendant to appoint an arbitrator in terms of contract agreement on the latter's behalf within 15 days. The defendant did not respond. Thereafter on 25-9-64 plaintiff made an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act for settlement of the dispute through the intervention of the Court. It may be stated that there was dispute with regards to plaintiff's claim for contract work done.
Ref: 20 D.L.R (1968)- 727
2025-07-29
The arbitrators enter upon reference when they take upon themselves the office of arbitrators. If they meet and determine the date of hearing and issue directions as to pleadings they exercise the functions of arbitrators and, therefore, they should be treated as having "entered on the reference". The routine notice given by the registrar prior to the constitution of the court of arbitration cannot be taken to be the date of the Arbitrators' entry on the reference for the reason that the Arbitrators did not legally come into existence on the said date. The mere submissions of written statements and papers may or may not amount to entering on the reference in accordance with the circumstances of each particular case; but it is sufficient to say that it is not before their constitution that the Arbitrators could be said to have entered on the reference.
Ref: 19 D.L.R (1967) -632
2025-07-28
The law requires that if the arbitration clause exists in the contract, the Court should stay the proceedings of the suit and allow the parties to take advantage of the arbitration clause. The position is not that the suit is to be dismissed but the proceedings are to be only stayed giving an opportunity to the defendant to have the dispute settled in accordance with the agreement by reference to the arbitration clause. Mere non-resort to the arbitration clause prior to the suit does not preclude the aggrieved party to take advantage of the speedier method of resolving the dispute. The plaintiff is not debarred from prosecuting the suit if the arbitration fails and as such, does not suffer from any disadvantage on the ground of limitation. The whole purpose of the provision of section 34 of the Arbitration Act was to ensure that the parties would honor the agreement to which they have subscribed in the beginning.
Ref: 19 D.L.R (1967) -376
2025-07-27
The contention raised was that in view of the fact that the suit in question arose in connection with an arbitration award passed by a arbitration tribunal provision of order 9, r. 13 are not applicable to such a case.
Held: The Code of Civil Procedure shall apply subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act and the Rules made thereunder. Consequently provision of Order 3, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the proceedings in a suit arising out of an award made by the arbitrators.
Ref: 17 D.L.R (1965) -737
2025-07-26
Court's Jurisdiction to remit under section 16 of the Arbitration Act on the ground of non-service of notice. It was contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to remit the arbitration proceeding back to the Tribunal of Arbitration under section 16 of the Arbitration Act 1949 on the ground of non-service of notice.
Hold: The Award purports to determine the is-sues and since such purported determination of issues was made behind the back of the parties, they cannot be treated as legal determination of issues. An adjudication made behind the back of the parties is no adjudication at all in the eye of law. In these circumstances it is permissible to remit the award back to Tribunal of Arbitration inasmuch as legally there has been no determination of issues raised before it.
Ref: 17 D.L.R (1965) -201
2025-07-22
The view put forward was that as there was a proceeding pending in a Civil Court challenging the validity of the contract, the Arbitrators had no jurisdiction to proceed with the proceeding in order to para an award.
Held: Marely because there was some proceeding in the Civil Court at the instance of one of the parties that did not ipso facto take away the jurisdiction of the Arbitrators to prosed with the case as the Arbitrators had admittedly the initial jurisdiction to decide the matters.
Ref: 16 D.L.R (1964) -260
2025-07-21
The Government of India notification of the 8th June 1938 cannot be treated as continuing in operation in that to hold otherwise would be tantamount to denying to Pakistan her sovereign right as a "power" to decide for herself as to which of the signatory States, if any, she would like to continue to have reciprocal arrangements for the enforcement of arbitral awards made in each other's territories in accordance with the simplified procedure indicated in the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937.
Ref: 14 D.L.R (SC) (1962) -151
2025-07-19
It is neither necessary nor proper for the national Courts to enter upon any investigation as to whether reciprocal provisions have in fact been made in the country where the award sought to he filed was made for the enforcement of award made in Pakistan. In matters pertaining to international arrangements the Courts should act in aid of the executive authority and should neither say nor do anything which might cause embarrassment to that authority in the conduct of its international relations.
Ref: 14 D.L.R (SC) (1962) -151
2025-07-17
The Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 was an existing law so far as British India was concerned and, as such, it was continued in force in Pakistan by reason of the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 15 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. But this by itself was not sufficient to make the Proto-col and convention operative ne the Act itself proscribed that before an award can be treated as a "foreign award" for the purposes of the said Act it must have been made in s territory declared by notification to be a territory to which the Convention applied and upon differences between persons who are subjects of Power declared by notification to be parties to the said Convention. No such notification has been published by the Government of Pakistan.
Ref: 14 D.L.R (SC) (1962) -151
2025-07-15
In the absence of any notification by the Central Government of Pakistan deolaring England to be a party to the Convention and her territories to be territories to which the said Convention applies an award of the Court of Arbitration, London cannot be held to be a "foreign award" within the meaning of section 2 of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1957 and cannot, therefore, be allowed to be filed in any Court in Pakistan or enforced like an award made in an arbitration proceeding in Pakistan or to which Arbitration Act, 1950 applied
Ref: 14 D.L.R (SC) (1962) -151
2025-07-14
The defendant Company in the present case knew how many bales were opened for inspection and at no stage of these proceedings has the correctness of the assertions of the plaintiff in this regard been challenged. Similarly, the costs of unloading etc. were not in dispute. If the figures were challenged by the defendant, there is no reason why the Court could not have ascertained them with reference to materials other than the awards. The question as to how many bales were actually opened, is a question relating to what happened before the arbitrators and if there were any dispute with regard to it, the arbitrators could be called as witnesses to ascertain the same.
Ref: 13 D.L.R (1961) -310
2025-07-13
The Chamber of Commerce are commercial Arbitrators, and they may be in a position to know the condition of the market. It is true that such commercial Arbitrators are chosen for their knowledge and experience of the trade so that they may be able to determine questions like market rate and damages without taking any evidence, but that does not mean that they will be able to determine the disputed question of fact namely, whether the defendant's alleged tender was illegally refused by the plaintiff or not without going into evidence. These Arbitrators have got to determine these questions judicially. If they blindly accept one party's statement on the disputed question of facts, it may very well be urged that they failed to apply their minds to the questions before them, and, as such, they were guilty of misconduct and dereliction of duty.
Ref: 12 D.L.R (1960) -590
2025-07-12
The object underlying the provisions of sub-secs. (1) and (2) of sec. 14 of the Arbitration Act is to ensure knowledge of the award actually signed by the arbitrators and also of the suit that may be filed in respect of the award. In the first case it is the arbitrators who have to give notice; in the second case it is the Court that has to give notice The object of these notices is to enable the parties concerned to take necessary steps after the award is made and signed and also when a suit is filed on the basis of the award for a decree, and if the parties come to know that an award has been made, the parties may require the arbitrators to file the award according to section 14, or even they can move the Court for the said direction. As soon as the arbitrators have made a complete award, the award is regarded as made and published. The absence of notice as required by sub-section (1) of section 14 by itself does not invalidate an award. The provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 14 relate to the procedure regarding an award and regarding a suit filed in respect of an award, and if the party who is entitled to notice cannot prove any prejudice on account of absence of notice by the arbitrators or by the Court, he cannot claim any relief, and on account of absence of notice alone the award cannot be held to be invalid. (6)Therefore an award cannot be held bad on account of non-service of notice under sub-section (1) of section 14.
Ref: 9 D.L.R (1957) -233
2025-07-10
The question for consideration that arose was whether upon a true construction of the above arbitration agreement, the case falls within sec. 9(b) of Arbitration Act or any other provisions of law relating to enforcement of such agreement.
Held: On a reading of the agreement it is clear that the intention of the parties was that there should be not two arbitrators and an umpire, but three arbitrators, one of whom should be the chairman or Surpanch.
Ref: 9 D.L.R (1957) -131
2025-07-07
In case of a dispute or a difference arising between both the parties, each of the parties shall appoint an arbitrator, and with the consent of both the parties or with the consent of the two arbitrators, a Surpanch shall be appointed, who shall bring about a mutual settlement and their decision shall be binding on both the parties".
Ref: 9 D.L.R (1957) -131
2025-07-06
It appears from the note given by the Superintendent of the Original Side that the learned Chief Justice informed through his Lordship’s secretary that by the present constitution the necessary nomination has been given under section 12 of the Act to the Company Judge to hear and dispose of an application filed under section 12 of the Act. Therefore, no further nomination by name is necessary
Ref: 9 B.L.C 636 [S.12]
2025-07-05
Parties to arbitration agreement may abandon by agreement to refer their disputes to arbitration or be discharged from the performance of the contract. The arbitration agreement may also be supersede. Civil suit is therefore never ipso facto intended to be barred in view of existence of an arbitration agreement.
Ref: 57 D.L.R 734 [S.10]
2025-07-02
The defendant has already commenced a proceeding against the plaintiff before the tribunal of the MCCI under the arbitration clause of the contract, which is not denied by the plaintiff. If it is so, under section 7 of the Act, the Subordinate Judge would have no jurisdiction to proceed further with the suit.
Ref: 56 D.L.R 224 [S.10]
2025-07-01
It is now clearly up to the Arbitral Tribunal to arrive at findings on this and other related issues. But that the tribunal may do so against the context of the subject matter of the Arbitration proceeding being extent on the date of any award that the Tribunal may make, this Court deems it prudent to preserve the Bank Guarantees up until such time as the Arbitral Tribunal itself will be in seisin of this matter, empowered as it otherwise to itself issue interim orders under section 21 and 7Ka (6) of the Act in particular. Conscious that this Court must necessarily under this Section 7Ka Application exercise restraint in arriving a substantive findings, it is deemed pertinent, however, to observe that the Arbitral Tribunal shall possibly be examining efforts at reviving Bank Guarantees that are long-expired, and this circumstance would make any examination of a subsequent waiver permission granted to the respondent No. 1 and the continued apprehension of the Petitioner of the encashment of the Bank Guarantees beyond 7-4-2009 a purely academic one.
Ref: 15 B.L.C 644 [S.7A]
2025-06-30
The provisions of section 7A and 21 of the Act, it is manifest that the application for addition of the party by the 2nd party to implead the 3rd party in the proceedings dose not come within in the ambit of law. Any signatory of the agreement is a necessary or proper party in the proceeding dose not call for decide at all.
Ref: 65 D.L.R 152 [S. 7A]
2025-06-28
The parties clearly intended that any dispute arising between them should settled thought arbitration. The express intention is re-enforced by clause 19.4 (h), which stipulates that the parties to be in agreement irrevocably agree not to initiate any proceeding, file any action or suit in any Court of competent jurisdiction except proceedings for the purpose of recognition an enforcement of the arbitral award. The scope for approaching the Court for determination of any issue including the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal has been expressly excluding by both the parties in writing. The incumbent, being a citizen of Bangladesh, appears, prima facie, to be disqualified to be appointed as arbitrator for settlement of any dispute between the parties, as per the provision of clause 19.4(c) of the RPF.
Ref: 19 B.L.C 284 [S.7A]
2025-06-26
Grant of interim measures is not within the purview of the Bangladeshi courts and any decision to the contrary would render the plain words of section 3(1) to be superfluous and redundant. By that reason alone, the petitioner’s section 7Ka application also stands to be dismissed.
Ref: 69 D.L.R 290. [S.7A]
2025-06-25
The purpose of any section 7Ka application is for the protection and preservation of the subject-matter of arbitral proceeding with a view to ensuring that any future award may remain effectively executable. For this Court to exercise its discretion under section 7Ka of the Act it is, in the view of this Court, sine qua non that there be a prima facie satisfaction that there has indeed, at one point in time or other been a meeting of minds between the parties to this Application to refer their disputes within a certain contractual selling to arbitration.
Ref: 13 B.L.C 457 [S.7A]
2025-06-23
Although monetary compensation may well be an adequate relief, nevertheless, there may be instance, as in the present case, where an order of injunction may still be necessary to preserve the subject matter of dispute for proper and effective adjudication of the matter. In the absence of an injunction, the subject matter of the dispute shall cease to exist and, therefore, the proceedings, whether before an Arbitral Tribunal or a Court of the Law, would, in effect, become infructuous. Accordingly, the application for vacating the order of direction date 28.01.2009 stands rejected.
Ref: 16 B.L.C 140 [S.7 A]
2025-06-23
The defendant has already commenced a proceeding against the plaintiff before the Tribunal of the MCCI under the arbitration clause of the contract, which is not denied by the plaintiff. If it is so, under section 7 of the Act, the Subordinate Judge would have no jurisdiction to proceed further with the suit.
Ref. 56 D.L.R 224.
2025-06-21
Parties to an arbitration agreement may abandon by agreement to refer their disputes to arbitration or be discharged from the performance of the contract. The arbitration agreement may also be superseded. Civil suit is therefore never ipso facto intended to be barred in view of existence of an arbitration agreement.
Ref: 57 D.L.R 734
2025-06-21
There is no legal scope to allow the application under Order VII, rule 11 of the Code for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit is barred by section 7 of the Act. To decide the truth of the truth of the matter evidence is necessary which can be available only in the course of trial of the suit. The plea of implied bar should ordinarily be decided on evidence.
Ref:21 B.L.C 184
2025-06-19
Section 7 of the Act enables the arbitration agreement to survive not just termination or breach of the matrix contract but also more serious. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitration agreement may survive as a distinct agreement even if the contract in which it is contained is regarded as invalid, non-existent or ineffective. The validity of the matrix contract may therefore be determined by arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement, and the resulting award will be enforceable, even if the tribunal determines that the matrix contract is invalid.
Ref: 20 B.L.C 72.
2025-06-18
Deed out of 77 deed of transfer of schedule- ‘B’ to the plaint and the plots relating to said 21 sale deeds we not referred to the arbitration tribunal as per the Arbitration agreement dated 6-2-2006 and the award date 4-5-2006 has got no manner of relation / connection with the said 21 deeds of transfer and as such the suit is very much maintainable with regard to those 21 deeds of transfer and plots. Thus the learned joint District Judge erred in law in rejecting the plaint of the suit as a whole.
Ref: 15 B.L.C 808.
2025-06-18
The appointment of the sole arbitrator made under section 12 of the Act being not objected to by the appellants at any time before any authority at the earliest possible stage, such appointment/jurisdiction of the arbitrator cannot be called in question after the award is passed. The same cannot be the ground for cancellation of the award under section 43(১) (ক) (উ) of the Act as the appellants waived their statutory right of such objection under section 6 of the Act and, as such, now they cannot take advantage of their own wrong upon changing their earlier stance.
Ref: 63 D.L.R -432